The Sui Foundation has successfully frozen $160 million in stolen funds, temporarily preventing the hacker from causing further damage. However, under the magnifying glass of public opinion questioning its "decentralization," all eyes are now on the Sui Foundation: how exactly will they handle these funds? Below, we explore several possibilities.
Current Constraints
The $160 million has been locked via a deny_list, meaning any transaction involving the hacker’s address is rejected by validators. To unlock the funds, the following must occur:
- Allowlist mechanism (green channel): Use 'transaction_allow_list_skip_all_checks' to bypass all security checks. Although the GitHub PR has been closed, this seems like a likely option.
- Hard fork: Directly modify protocol rules and on-chain state. This is a costly and extreme measure.
- Permanent freeze: Do nothing and maintain the status quo, resulting in an unexpected "deflation" for Sui.
Analysis of Possible Unlock Scenarios
1. Allowlist Mechanism + Community Governance Vote
A democratic on-chain governance vote could be initiated: "Do you agree to return the frozen funds proportionally?" If passed, the Sui Foundation would batch return transactions using the 'transaction_allow_list_skip_all_checks' allowlist, skipping deny_list restrictions to execute fund transfers directly.
While this approach appears community-backed, the centralized distribution of SUI tokens means the vote outcome could be heavily influenced by the Foundation, merely dressing up centralization in democratic clothing.
2. Pure Allowlist Mechanism Refund
The Sui Foundation could directly add return transactions to the allowlist, bypassing the deny_list and distributing funds to victims according to predefined rules.
This would effectively position the Foundation as a "super administrator," severely damaging Sui's decentralization reputation.
3. Negotiate with Hacker for Proportional Return
Although the deny_list currently limits the hacker’s options, any successful negotiation would still require the Foundation to use the allowlist mechanism for execution. Negotiation holds little technical meaning now, and attempting to掩盖 allowlist actions through this method would be akin to掩盖 truth by condoning malicious behavior.
4. Hard Fork to Directly Modify State
Release a new client version that includes state modifications, directly rewriting asset ownership for frozen addresses at the protocol level, and wait for most validators to upgrade.
Similar to Ethereum’s handling of The DAO event, this risks network分裂 and minority chains like ETC.强行 altering blockchain immutability is a dangerous move for a new blockchain, especially in today’s saturated market, unlike Ethereum’s more forgiving environment in 2016.
5. Allowlist + Third-Party Regulatory Custody
Use the allowlist to transfer frozen funds to a neutral institution, seeking endorsement from authoritative regulators like the SEC or CFTC, and execute decisions through public hearings.
This would position Sui as a "model student" for Crypto compliance. While it may sound far-fetched, remember that Sui’s team originated from Facebook’s Libra, which faced regulatory scrutiny. Proactive compliance might avoid renewed targeting, though using political compliance to掩盖 centralization would likely spark controversy.
6. Allowlist + DeFi Fund Long-Term Compensation
The Foundation could develop a new fund management contract, use the allowlist to transfer frozen funds to it, and inject effective returns from ecosystem activities, allowing users to receive long-term, linearly released gains.
This strategy cleverly turns victims into beneficiaries and critics into supporters, leveraging the principle that only affected parties should have a say to平息 meaningless market舆论. However, this is a complex economic governance方案 with significant implementation uncertainties.
7. Maintain Status Quo: Permanent Freeze and Deflation
Abandon the allowlist idea; the Foundation takes no additional action, keeping the deny_list intact. Frozen assets remain permanently non-circulating, equivalent to SUI achieving "deflation."
8. Time Arbitrage Strategy
Delay addressing the frozen funds issue long-term, secretly accumulating tokens when market confidence wanes and prices drop. Then, suddenly announce full compensation at an optimal timing.
Citing technical complexity, governance challenges, or legal compliance, the Foundation could prolong the issue, exploiting market despair to buy $SUI low. Later, during a favorable market cycle, execute a one-time full payout on top of the existing deflation.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the deny_list mechanism?
The deny_list is a security feature where validators reject any transaction involving specific addresses, effectively freezing associated funds. It requires protocol-level changes or allowlists to bypass.
Why is community governance controversial for Sui?
SUI token distribution is relatively centralized, meaning large holders or the Foundation could disproportionately influence vote outcomes, undermining true decentralization.
Could a hard fork cause a chain split?
Yes, as seen in Ethereum’s past, modifying core rules can lead to divisions where some validators reject changes, potentially creating a separate chain like ETC.
How might regulatory involvement help?
Involving agencies like the SEC could provide legitimacy and compliance backing, but it may also attract scrutiny and conflict with crypto’s decentralization ethos.
What are the risks of permanent freezing?
Permanently locking funds reduces circulating supply, causing deflation. While it may boost token value, it harms affected users and could damage trust in the network.
Is negotiation with the hacker feasible?
Given the deny_list lock, the hacker has little leverage. Any deal would still require technical execution by the Foundation, making negotiation largely symbolic.
Conclusion
The Sui Foundation faces a complex dilemma balancing technical solutions, decentralization principles, and community trust. Each option carries significant trade-offs, and the chosen path will likely shape Sui’s future trajectory in the competitive blockchain landscape. For now, the market awaits an official resolution. 👉 Explore more strategies for handling blockchain crises